Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SS-15 NSC-10 PRS-01 PA-03 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 H-02 CU-04 PM-07 EUR-25 SAJ-01

OMB-01 DODE-00 RSR-01 EB-11 /107 W ----- 059841

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FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO USIA WASHDC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9180
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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USLO PEKING

FOR: IOR/MEDIA REACTION; IEA

E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: PFOR, TW

SUBJECT: PRESS REACTION REPORT

1. SUMMARY -- KMT OFFICIAL CENTRAL DAILY NEWS JULY 11
SAID KISSINGER'S IMPENDING PEKING VISIT WAS PROMPTED BY
"MAOIST TEMPTATION AND INTIMIDATION" AND WARNED WASHINGTON
"NOT TO DANCE TO THE MAOIST BATON." PAPER ALSO
PUBLISHED REPORT BY ITS U.S. CORRESPONDENT THAT
KISSINGER MAY REACHED MORE AGREEMENTS WITH CHINESE
COMMUNISTS ON GENERAL CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.
LEADING CHINA TIMES JULY 10 SAID PEKING'S REACTION TO
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AGREEMENT REVEALED DISTRUST OF THE
UNITED STATES WHICH WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO THE BREAKDOWN
OF "U.S.-MAOIST COLLABORATION." LOCAL PAPERS ALSO
REPORTED THAT 11 U.S. CONGRESSMEN JULY 10 AGAIN CALLED
FOR CONGRESSIONAL REASSURANCE THAT WASHINGTON WOULD NOT
IMPAIR ROC INTERESTS IN EFFORTS TO LESSEN TENSION WITH
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PRC. IV GRANTEE CHINA TIMES YEN YU-CHENG REPORTED

MEETINGS WITH AMERICAN JOURNALISTS IN WASHINGTON, QUOTING JAMES RESTON AND CROSBY NOYES AS SAYING THAT THEY ANTICIPATE NO MAJOR POLITICAL BREAKTHROUGH IN U.S.-PRC RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING TAIWAN QUESTION. END SUMMARY.

- 2. KMT OFFICIAL CENTRAL DAILY NEWS JULY 11: "... ON THE SURFACE, KISSINGER'S IMPENDING TRIP (TO PEKING) IS NIXON'S IDEA. ACTUALLY, THE TRIP WAS PROMPTED BY MAOIST TEMPTATION AND INTIMIDATION IN AN ATTEMPT TO SUBTLY LURE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTO THE OUAGMIRE OF NO RETURN... NOW, THE MAOISTS ARE ALL SMILES TOWARD AMERICA. BANDIT CHIANG CHING EVEN PUT ON A CHIH-PAO AND SCARF WHEN ACCOMPANYING DAVID BRUCE TO A BALL GAME. HUANG CHEN INDICATED TO NIXON THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS "HAVE THE INTENTION" TO SETTLE THE CAMBODIAN WAR. THESE ARE THE 'SOFT' TACTICS OF THE MAOISTS... THE NUCLEAR BOMB TEST BY THE MAOIST RIGHT AFTER THE NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT WAS OBVIOUSLY NO COINCIDENCE. THE MAOIST WANTED TO BLACKMAIL THE UNITED STATES WITH THE NUCLEAR FALLOUT THAT REACHED CALIFORNIA. THEY WANTED TO REMIND NIXON AND BREZHNEV OF THEIR NUCLEAR TEETH. THIS INTIMIDATING PERFORMANCE AND THOSE TEMPTATIONS OFFERED BY CHIANG CHING AND CHOU EN-LAI, BOTH SOFT AND HARD, PROMPTED KISSINGER'S TRIP.
- 3. "FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PRACTICAL INTEREST, THE UNITED STATES REAPED NO PRACTICAL BENEFIT FROM NIXON'S BREAKTHROUGH IN THE PAST YEAR... IF AMERICA CONCEDES THREE INCHES ON OTHER QUESTIONS, THE MAOISTS MAY CONCEDE ONE INCH ON THE CAMBODIA QUESTION. BUT THEY WILL SURELY WANT TO TAKE BACK TWICE AS MUCH AS THEY HAVE CONCEDED... BASED ON TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP, WE OFFER THE ABOVE ADVICE PRIOR TO KISSINGER'S DEPARTURE TO THE MAINLAND. WE HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WILL CALMLY CONSIDER THE STAKES, HEIGHTEN THEIR VIGILANCE AND NEVER MERRILY DANCE TO THE TEMPTING BATON OF THE MAOISTS."
- 4. CENTRAL DAILY NEWS CORRESPONDENT FROM NEW YORK JULY UNCLASSIFIED

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10: "... ACCORDING TO OBSERVATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES, THERE IS NO SIGNS THAT THERE WILL BE A FURTHER STEP OF COLLABORATION OR SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT AFTER BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SO-CALLED 'LIAISON OFFICES.' IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT THE ACCORDS KISSINGER MAY REACH IN PEIPING WILL BE IN THE SCOPE OF CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS... HE MAY ALSO TOUCH ON THE PROBLEM OF '49"3, - 35, 'BUT

NOT NECESSARILY WITH ANY ANSWER FORTHCOMING. AS TO 'MOST PREFERRED NATION TREATMENT,' THE FINAL SAY RESTS WITH CONGRESS. FURTHER COLLABORATION IN OTHER CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IS POSSIBLE. BUT WASHINGTON DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY NEW 'NIXON SHOCK.'.."

5. LEADING PRIVATELY-OWNED CHINA TIMES JULY 10: "... CHOU EN-LAI'S INTERVIEW WITH THE JAPANESE KYODO NEW AGENCY (IN WHICH HE SAID THE U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AGREEMENT IS DECEPTIVE AND DANGEROUS) FURTHER PROVES THE CONSTANT BUILT-IN FEARS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. THEY PULL THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR SIDE, WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY STRUGGLE AGAINST IT. THE UNITED STATES APPROACHES THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS FOR CLOSER RELATIONS. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, NEVER STOPS TO HEIGHTEN ITS VIGILANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SUM OF THE NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT IS UNFAVORABLE TO THE MAOIST. THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONS AMONG THE THREE IS NOT EQUIVALENT. CLOSER U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS INEVITABLY MEAN A WIDER GAP BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PEIPING... PEIPING CAN TRUST NEITHER WASHINGTON NOR MOSCOW... SINCE THEIR ADOPTION OF THE 'ALLYING AMERICA AGAINST SOVIET' LINE, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT A SENIOR MAOIST LEADER LIKE CHOU HAS OPENLY LABELED A CERTAIN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AS UNRELIABLE AND DANGEROUS. THIS REVEALS THE DEEPENING OF PEIPING'S DISTRUST OF WASHINGTON AND ALSO THE WORSENING OF CHOU'S INTERNAL POSITION AS A RESULT OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH MAY PROVOKE ANOTHER POWER STRUGGLE AND BRING ABOUT THE BREAK DOWN OF THE 'STAGE BY STAGE COLLABORATION' BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAOIST IN THEIR MUTUAL ATTEMPT TO USE ONE ANOTHER. NOW IS THE EVE OF A BIG TEMPEST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CENTERING UNCLASSIFIED

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AROUND THE TRIANGULAR STRUGGLE OF WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND

PEIPING. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE SUFFERING BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY. WE CAN, WITH SOUND JUDGEMENT AND STRONG FAITH, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE DEVELOPMENTS TO CREATE A NEW PROSPECT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. LOOKING AROUND THE WORLD, TODAY IS OUR OPPORTUNE MOMENT. WE HOPE THAT BOTH OUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WILL DOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION."

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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SS-15 NSC-10 PM-07 PRS-01 PA-03 CIAE-00

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- 6. IN A REPORT JULY 10 ON HIS MEETINGS WITH NOTED AMERICAN JOURNALISTS, CHINA TIMES GRANTEE YEN YE-CHENG QUOTED JAMES RESTON AND CROSBY NOYES ON CHINA QUESTION. YEN MADE NO PERSONAL COMMENT BUT SAID HE RESPECTED THEIR INFLUENCE WHETHER OR NOT HE AGREES WITH THEIR VIEWS:
- 7. RESTON: "BECAUSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BIG POWERS WOULD NO LONGER FIGHT A WAR FOR OTHER COUNTRIES. THEY WOULD RATHER NEGOTIATE AND COMPROMISE WITH EACH OTHER TO SOLVE QUESTIONS. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT ONLY THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WOULD HAVE TO RELY ON ITSELF, BUT EVEN BRITAIN AND FRANCE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO FIND THEIR OWN WAYS TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION. IT IS IMPRACTICAL FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO HARBOR ANY INTENTION TO RELY SOLELY ON THE UNITED STATES... THE DEVELOPMENTS OF U.S.-CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS AT THE PRESENT STAGE IS FASTER THAN ANTICIPATED. HOWEVER, SUCH VELOCITY WILL NOT CONTINUE. THERE MAY BE MASSIVE INCREASES IN TRADE, BUT THERE WILL NOT BE ANY MAJOR UNCLASSIFIED

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DEVELOPMENT IN THE POLITICAL AREA. THE CHINA QUESTION HAS TO BE SETTLED BY THE CHINESE. IN THE PAST, THE CHINESE HAVE HAD BITTER EXPERIENCE WITH FOREIGN INTERVENTION. SUCH AS THE OUESTION OF FOREIGN SETTELEMTNS IN CHINA. THAT TIME HAS PASSED. IT WOULD BE IN-APPROPRIATE IF ANY FORMULA WERE IMPOSED TO SOLVE THE TAIWAN QUESTION. THAT WOULD NOT BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE UNITED STATES. NEITHER WOULD IT BE TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ADVANTAGE. AT PRESENT, MANY AMERICANS ARE STILL OPPOSED TO ANY EXPEDIENT SOLUTION TO THE CHINA OUESTION. FOLLOWING BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS MAY TRY TO STEP UP THEIR EFFORTS TO WOO WASHINGTON. BUT THEIR NEXT STEP IS RATHER HARD TO PREDICT. THEY HAVE SENT A LIAISON OFFICER TO WASHINGTON DESPITE CHOU EN-LAI'S PLEDGE TWO YEARS AGO (TO RESTON) THAT PEIPING WOULD NOT HAVE ANY DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AS LONG AS THERE IS A ROC EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. AFTER THE DEATH OF THE OLDER GENERATION CHINESE COMMUNISTS, NO ONE CAN GUARANTEE THAT PEIPING WILL NOT ALLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION AGAIN."

8. NOYES: "THE CHINESE COMMUNNISTS WOULD LIKE TO SEE AMERICAN TROOPS WITHDRAWN FROM ASIA, BUT PREFER TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES RETAIN ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH IN ASIA. THIS IS CONTRADICTORY. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS BELIEVE THAT AMERICAN SUPPORT TO THE VARIOUS NORTHEAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES CONSTITUTES AN ENCIRCLEMENT THREAT, ZTT THEN THEY ALSO SEE THE THREAT AS LESS SERIOUS THAN THE SOVIET THREAT. THAT IS WHY THEY ARE NOT EAGER AT THIS MOMENT TO REPELL THE AMERICAN THREAT. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD TERMINATE THE SINO(ROC)-U.S. MUTUTAL SECURITY TREATY. BUT THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, IT SEEMS, HAVE NOT BEEN EAGERLY PERSUADING THE UNITED STATES TO SOLVE THE QUESTION. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THEY KNOW THAT THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES, AND NO POLITICAL ANDVOR MILITARY PRESSURE WOULD EASILY PERSUADE THE UNITED STATES TO GIVE UP. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS UNCLASSIFIED

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BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THE UNITED STATES IS RATHER UNLIKELY. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS GAVE (NOYES) THE IMPRESSION THAT CHOU EN-LAI WOULD NOT MEET PRESIDENT NIXON IN AMERICA BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THIS IS EQUIVALENT TO THE RECOGNITION OF PRESENT U.S. CHINA POLICY, THEN, THE ELEVATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST AND AMERICAN LIAISON OFFICE

TO FORMAL EMBASSIES IS IMPOSSIBLE. PRESIDENT NIXON IS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE WITHIN THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM HIS CHINA POLICY... AFTER THE VIETNAM WAR, MANY ASIAN COUNTRIES ARE AT A LOSS. BUT GIVEN HALF A YEAR, ASIA, ESPECIALLY SOUTHEAST ASIA, WILL BECOME MORE STABLIZED AND THE ASIAN COUNTRIES WILL GRADUALLY UNDERSTAND BETTER U.S. ASIAN POLICY."

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